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and Its Differential Modulation
by Visuomotor and Visuotactile Mismatches
Marte Roel Lesur,1,4,5,*Marieke LieveWeijs,1,4 Colin Simon,1Oliver Alan Kannape,2,3 and Bigna Lenggenhager1,*
SUMMARY
Altered states of embodiment are fundamental to the scientific understanding of bodily self con-
sciousness. The feeling of disembodiment during everyday activities is common to clinical conditions;
however, the direct study of disembodiment in experimental setups is rare compared to the extensive
investigation of illusory embodiment of an external object. Using mixed reality to modulate embodi-
ment through temporally mismatching sensory signals from the own body, we assessed how such mis-
matches affect phenomenal and physiological aspects of embodiment and measured perceptual
thresholds for these across multimodal signals. The results of a principal component analysis suggest
that multimodal mismatches generally induce disembodiment by increasing the sense of disownership
and deafference and decreasing embodiment; however, this was not generally reflected in physiolog-
ical changes. Although visual delay decreased embodiment both during active movement and passive
touch, the effect was stronger for the former. We discuss the relevance of these findings for under-
standing bodily self plasticity.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, experimental evidence has shown that the sense of body of healthy subjects is
remarkably plastic and built upon a constant prediction, weighting, and integration of multimodal signals
(e.g. Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson, 2012; Kilteni et al., 2015). Protocols involving multimodal stimulation suggest
that a majority of healthy individuals embody foreign or virtual limbs or full bodies when bodily sensations
(e.g. body movements or touch) are visually displayed in synchrony to matching sensations on the hidden
body (e.g. Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Slater et al., 2010).
Such illusory embodiment is usually manifested by the senses of body ownership and agency (Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris et al., 2006) as well as self location (Longo et al., 2008) and has been evidenced
using a variety of experimental setups using both explicit (e.g. questionnaire) and implicit (e.g. propriocep-
tive drift or physiological response) measures (Blanke et al., 2015).
This line of research predominately investigated the influence of multimodal coherence on illusory embodi-
ment of an external or supernumerary bodily object; far more elusive, however, is how breaking multimodal
information about the own body might reduce embodiment or even induce a feeling of disembodiment
(Gentile et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2015; Hoover and Harris, 2012; Kannape et al., 2019; Newport and Pres-
ton, 2011; Otsuru et al., 2014; Newport andGilpin, 2011; Longo and Haggard, 2009; Osumi et al., 2018). This
is surprising, as disorders of bodily self awareness in clinical populations predominantly manifest in a loss of
embodiment, as a break of (own) body ownership and one’s sense of agency (Aglioti et al., 1996; Brugger
and Lenggenhager, 2014; Otsuru et al., 2014; Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). For example, in the case of soma-
toparaphrenia, resulting from a brain lesion, patients lack the feeling of ownership for the contralesional
arm, often attributing that arm to someone else (Aglioti et al., 1996; Brugger and Lenggenhager, 2014; Val-
lar and Ronchi, 2009) or even showing aggression toward it (Loetscher et al., 2006). Similarly, individuals
suffering from body integrity dysphoria feel strong alienation from one or several body parts often com-
bined with a desire for amputation (Blom et al., 2012; Brugger and Lenggenhager, 2014; Lenggenhager
et al., 2015). Such a feeling of disembodiment might also extend to the full body, both in neurological
(Smit et al., 2018) as well as in psychiatric disorders, as during depersonalization (Davidson, 1966; Sierra
et al., 2005) or borderline personality disorder (Lo¨ffler et al., 2019).
Important theoretical differences between ownership of an external body, reduced ownership for one’s
own body, and body disownership have been proposed (de Vignemont, 2011), and the degree of alteration
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in embodiment of the own body in illusory limb or full-body ownership paradigms remains elusive.
Although some authors suggest decreased ownership for the real body based on questionnaire (Longo
et al., 2008; Moseley et al., 2008; Lane et al., 2017) or even immunological data (Barnsley et al., 2011), others
found disownership of one’s own body to be rare and rather weak in rubber-hand-illusion-like setups (Fo-
legatti et al., 2009). Data from individuals with clinically caused alterations leading to loss of own-body
ownership generally suggest enhanced illusory ownership for an external body, pointing to different mech-
anisms between embodiment and disembodiment in patients suffering from schizophrenia (Thakkar et al.,
2011; see Shaqiri et al., 2018 for alternative findings during full body illusions), body integrity dysphoria
(Lenggenhager et al., 2015), or somatoparaphrenia (Smit et al., 2018; van Stralen et al., 2013; White and Ai-
mola Davies, 2017). This is further evidenced by a voxel-based lesion symptommapping study that found a
partial dissociation between brain areas involved in own-limb disembodiment as compared with supernu-
merary embodiment (Martinaud et al., 2017).
Here we directly manipulated embodiment of one’s biological hand using a controlled multisensory
conflict, without the use of a proxy/rubber hand. Previous studies suggest a feeling of disownership and
numbness during delayed and therefore conflicting visual feedback of a tactile or motor event in a mixed
reality setup using an infrared camera feed (Kannape et al., 2019), a mixed reality setup using a prerecorded
video (Gentile et al., 2013), or in theMIRAGE setup where participants enter their hand in a box where visual
aspects (spatial or temporal) of the hand are altered (e.g. Newport and Preston, 2010; Newport and Pres-
ton, 2011). We adapted such setups to be more realistic and ecologically valid using a wide field of view
webcam mounted on a head-mounted display (HMD), providing an online, naturally colored, view of the
video feed. This setup provides a direct view on the own full body in its current environment as seen
from a first-person perspective, roughly corresponding to the direct view of the own body. Our setup
was created to induce a strong prior assumption of actually viewing one’s own body and surroundings.
We then manipulated the delay of the video feed digitally, thus controlling the latency of visual as
compared to other bodily signals (i.e. tactile, motor, or potentially others). We used this setup in two
different experiments to evaluate the relative influence of multimodal mismatches about one’s own
body on the sense of embodiment and its physiological correlates. Importantly, although previous studies
investigated the effect of either visuotactile incongruency or visuomotor incongruency on the sense of
embodiment (e.g. Tsakiris et al., 2010; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014), the systematic comparison of
these and their contribution to disembodiment remains scarce. Yet, differential roles of motor and somato-
sensory signals in the sense of body have been suggested (Asai, 2015; Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2010), and the
role of actively (moving) in comparison to passively perceiving bodily signals to the bodily self has been
extensively discussed (Grechuta et al., 2019; Pia et al., 2019). We thus compared the relative contribution
of breaking visuomotor versus breaking visuotactile signals to disembodiment.
In Experiment 1 (Figure 1A), we manipulated visuotactile coherence, which is classically used to induce altered
embodiment in rubber-hand-illusion-likeparadigms. For two stimulation durations (1 and3min) the participant’s
handwas strokedwith a paintbrush while the visual feedback, was either delayed (disembodiment illusion con-
dition) or not (control condition). Alterations in embodiment, ownership, sensations of deafferentation, and
related phenomenal sensations were measured using questionnaires adapted from Botvinick and Cohen
(1998), Kannape et al. (2019), Lenggenhager et al. (2007), and Longo et al. (2008). To further understand the
phenomenal qualities, we used a psychometric approach by performing a principal component analysis
(PCA) on the questionnaire data of a larger sample. Furthermore, previously suggested implicit correlates of
embodiment, namely skin temperature (see Moseley et al., 2008, but see also de Haan et al., 2017 for a critical
view) and skin conductance responses (SCR) to threat (seeArmel andRamachandran, 2003) were assessed.Heart
rate variability (HRV) measures were added, as homeostatic processes have suggested to be altered in condi-
tions of alteration in body ownership (Barnsley et al., 2011). A measure of interoceptive accuracy has been
included, as poor accuracy has previously shown to be related to higher susceptibility to illusory ownership
and thus a more plastic bodily self (Monti et al., 2019; Tsakiris et al., 2011; but for exceptions see Crucianelli
et al., 2018 and David et al., 2014). We hypothesized that the sensory conflict between tactile and delayed visual
feedback would result in a reduced sense of embodiment and enhanced sense of disembodiment, which would
be reflected in both explicit (subjective) and implicit (physiological) measures, especially in participants with a
weak interoceptive accuracy.
In Experiment 2 (Figure 1B), we investigated the temporal thresholds for detecting synchrony for visuomo-
tor as compared to visuotactile delays and how different delays relate to the feeling of disembodiment.
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Participants were exposed to 40 trials in each condition with differing delays across a range of 139–733 ms,
and after each trial synchrony perception and the feeling of ownership were assessed. These were followed
by a block of longer stimulation of 90 s in both a visuomotor and visuotactile condition where the visual
feedback was either delayed (disembodiment illusion condition) or not (control condition). Systematic
empirical comparisons of these multimodal couplings remain rather scarce, with some studies suggesting
similarly strong bodily illusions for visuomotor and visuotactile synchrony (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012,
2014), others suggesting that visuomotor synchrony may be more important for illusory embodiment
than visuotactile synchrony (Kokkinara and Slater, 2014; Roel Lesur et al., 2018), and some suggesting
the relative importance of active movements versus passive touch for an integrated and global sense of
body (Burin et al., 2015; Tsakiris et al., 2010, 2006). Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that the
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Figure 1. Experimental Procedure
Experimental setup in (A) Experiment 1 and (B) Experiment 2. In both experiments participants were sitting down with
both hands placed on a table. In Experiment 1, the visuotactile stimulation was either synchronous (VT sync) or
asynchronous (VT async). Each stimulation was followed by a knife threat and in the 60 s blocks also by the embodiment
questionnaire (Q). The 60 s blocks were always presented first, followed by the 180 s blocks. The order of VT sync and VT
async was counterbalanced across participants. In Experiment 2 the visuotactile stimulation was similar to that of
Experiment 1. Here, visuomotor or visuotactile stimulation were presented for 7 s during which the participant’s hand was
stroked two times. After each 7 s trial two questions appeared on the HMD. This was repeated 40 times for each modality,
with four repetitions of 10 possible delay steps. Then, a long block followed with synchronous visuotactile (VT sync) and
visuomotor (VM sync) as well as asynchronous visuotactile (VT async) and visuomotor (VM async) stimulation presented in
counterbalanced order.
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temporal window of multisensory integration of peripheral signals is narrowed when followed by efferent
signals as compared to only afferent signals (Zierul et al., 2019); however, these findings have not explicitly
been linked to the sense of body.
RESULTS
Results of Experiment 1
Principal Component Analysis Reveals Three Main Components of Disembodiment
A PCA was used to investigate the structure of participants’ experience and to quantify the complex expe-
rience during this illusion. The PCA was conducted on the questionnaire data after synchronous or asyn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation. Data from Experiment 1 (n = 30), Experiment 2 (n = 32), and additional
data from an unpublished experiment of 15 participants were used for the PCA. After running a primary
PCA to determine the number of components, a secondary PCA with three components was used for
the analysis. The three components together explained 68% of the variance in the questionnaire data
(see Table 1 for component loadings after varimax rotation and explained variance of each component).
The first component was termed disownership and comprised items that refer to the experience of not
belonging of the body, alienation, and perceiving the body as an image rather than an actual body (q4,
q6, and q9). The second component was termed deafference (Longo et al., 2008) and included items
related to the feeling of numbness, vividness, and disappearing of the body (q10, q8, and q7). The final
component, embodiment, consisted of items related to the experience of own body ownership, agency,
and looking at one’s own body (q1, q11, and q5).
Responses to questionnaire items are in line with our hypotheses (Figure 2, see Table S2 for descriptive
statistics and results of the comparisons for all individual items). Participants reported a relative increase
Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings Commonalities
Sometimes I Felt. Component 1
Disownership
Component 2
Deafference
Component 3
Embodiment
q4 Alienation from my body .81 .21 .05 .70
q6 As if my body does not
belong to me anymore
.78 .18 .29 .73
q9 The seen body as an
image rather than as
my actual body
.65 .24 -.04 .50
q10 As if my body was numb .12 .81 -.03 .68
q8 As though the experience
of my hand was less vivid
than normal
.23 .81 -.14 .73
q7 As though my body had
disappeared
.25 .78 .30 .75
q1 As if the body I saw was
my own
.02 .00 .89 .79
q11 As if I could move the
seen body
.10 .05 .81 .67
q5 As if I was looking at another
person’s body
.53 -.05 .57 .61
Eigenvalues 2.11 2.06 1.98
% Of variance 23 23 22
Table 1. Factor Loadings from the PCA on Nine Items of the Questionnaire in the Asynchronous Visuotactile
Condition
Note. Factor loadings >.50 are in boldface.
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of disownership, deafference (though generally low [<0.5] in both conditions), and a relative reduction of
embodiment (though generally still high [>0.5] in both conditions) after asynchronous visuotactile
stimulation compared with synchronous stimulation. As expected, responses to the control item (q3)
did not differ between conditions, and the manipulation check item (q2) differed between the synchronous
and asynchronous condition, which confirmed that participants were able to perceive the manipulation.
Skin Conductance Response to Threat Is Not Altered
Previous studies demonstrated that SCRs to threats increased after synchronous stroking in rubber-hand–
illusion-like paradigms (e.g. Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008): a study showed
reduced SCR to a threat after multisensory mismatching stimulation (Gentile et al., 2013), another a reduc-
tion of SCR after stimulating illusory dissapearance of the hand (Newport and Gilpin, 2011), and a similar
pattern after asynchronous multimodal stimulation (Newport and Preston, 2010, 2011). As disownership
was higher in the asynchronous condition, we hypothesized that SCRs would be reduced as compared
to the synchronous condition. Even though we found an increase in skin conductance after threat, we
did not observe significant differences between the synchronous and asynchronous condition in neither
the short, (synchronous: Mdn = 1.13, IQR = 0.90–1.38; asynchronous: Mdn = 0.94, IQR = 0.71–1.16; Z =
1.42, p = .16) nor the long block (synchronous: Mdn = 1.01, IQR = 0.60–1.19; asynchronous Mdn =
0.94, IQR = 0.58–1.10; Z = 0.48, p = .63). This indicates that there was no evidence for a difference in
the sympathetic activation in response to a threatening stimulus to the hand after asynchronous as
compared to synchronous stimulation, even though participants subjectively experienced less embodi-
ment and increased disownership over their own hand according to the questionnaire.
Skin Temperature Is Not Altered
Comparisons between synchronous and asynchronous conditions in the short block did not reveal any signif-
icant differences between conditions in temperature change for the neck (p = .76), right hand (p = .38), or left
hand (p = .27). However, in the long block, there was a significantly smaller increase in skin temperature of the
left hand across the trial in the asynchronous (Mdn = 0.038, IQR = 0.009–0.143) than synchronous condition
(Mdn = 0.078, IQR = 0.012–0.158; Z = 2.09, p = .04, r = .30). We further aimed to disentangle this small
but significant effect for the left hand, by assessing differences between the conditions in each of the three mi-
nutes separately, but these analyses did not show any significant differences for any of these time periods (all
ps> .48). There were no significant differences for the neck (p = .37) or the right hand (p = .72).
Heartrate Variability Is Not Altered
HRV, as quantified by the RMSSD, did not differ between the synchronous (Mdn = 30.62, IQR = 21.22–54.37)
and the asynchronous condition (Mdn = 32.84, IQR = 24.61–45.30; Z = 0.25).
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Figure 2. Questionnaire Responses Clustered by the PCA Factors Questionnaire data, medians, and interquartile
ranges are displayed.
The three components of the questionnaire differed significantly between the synchronous (sync) and asynchronous (async)
visuotactile (VT) stimulation in Experiment 1 (A). In Experiment 2 (B) there were significant differences between the synchronous
and asynchronous stimulation for both the visuotactile, and visuomotor (VM) stimulation, as well as between visuotactile and
visuomotor stimulation in the asynchronous, but not the synchronous, condition. *p < .05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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No Relation of Illusion Strength and Interoceptive Accuracy
Overall mean interoceptive accuracy was 0.62G 0.17, which is comparable to other studies (e.g. Garfinkel
et al., 2015). We performed a median split on interoceptive accuracy scores to assess the differences in pre-
viously reported significant effects of synchrony between participants with high (Mdn = 0.77, IQR = 0.67–
0.85) and low (Mdn = 0.46, IQR = 0.43–0.52) interoceptive accuracy. There was no significant difference be-
tween participants with high and low accuracy in the subjective strength of the illusion (difference between
category average in synchronous and asynchronous) for the disownership (Z = 0.48, p = .63), deafference
(Z = 0.33, p = .74), and embodiment (Z = 0.63, p = .53) category.
Summarized Results of Experiment 1
In this first experiment we showed that asynchronously shown stroking of one’s own real hand using a
video-based virtual reality setup leads, as predicted, to consistent and significant changes in the subjective
sense of the bodily self as indicated by the responses to the questionnaire. According to the principal
component analysis the response to this questionnaire can be clustered in three main components, namely
disownership, deafference, and embodiment. During asynchronous as compared with synchronous strok-
ing embodiment for one’s own body is reduced, whereas the sense of disowernship and deafference is
enhanced. In contrast to our prediction based on rubber-hand-illusion-like setups, despite these manipu-
lations we did not evidence any physiological changes. There was no evidence for changes in the electro-
dermal response to threat, and the temperature measure only showed amild trend toward a lesser increase
in hand temperature in the asynchronous condition. Furthermore, we did not find the predicted relation
between the individual strength of interoception and the subjective measures of the illusion.
Results of Experiment 2
Questionnaire Ratings Reveal Subjective Changes after Asynchronous Stimulation with a Stronger
Effect of Visuomotor Than Visuotactile Signals
To assess the subjective experience of participants after 90 s of visuotactile or visuomotor stimulation, differ-
ences between responses to questionnaire items in the asynchronous and synchronous conditions were
assessed (see Figure 3; and Tables S4 and S5 for descriptive statistics and results for each individual item).
The results confirmed our hypothesis that asynchronous visuotactile and visuomotor stimulation induced a
feeling of disownership for the seen body and followed a same pattern as in Experiment 1. There was a signif-
icant main effect of condition for the three illusion-related factors that were determined in the PCA (see section
Principal Component Analysis Reveals ThreeMainComponents ofDisembodiment). Interestingly, the reduction
of embodiment and increase in deafference and disownership were stronger in the asynchronous visuomotor
than visuotactile condition. There were no significant differences between conditions for the control item (q3),
and the differences in q2 confirmed that participants were able to perceive the manipulation.
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Figure 3. Predicted Ownership by Delay and Sensitivity to Delay
The three-way interaction of delay, modality (visuotactile [VT] and visuomotor [VM]), and sensitivity is displayed. Lines
show predicted values from the model, where sensitivity was set to M  1 SD for high sensitivity and M + 1 SD for low
sensitivity for visualization purposes.
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Synchrony Judgements Did Not Differ between Modalities
To assess whether sensitivity to delay was affected by modality of stimulation, we compared the PSE in the
visuomotor (M = 0.338, SE = 0.015) and visuotactile condition (M = 0.327, SE = 0.014). There was no signif-
icant difference between the two conditions (Z =.55, p = .58). Sensitivity was also not correlated with
relative changes in any of the questionnaire components between the synchronous and asynchronous stim-
ulation in both the visuotactile (all ps> .59) and visuomotor (all ps> .44) conditions. Crucially, responses to
only 2.3% of all trials in the visuotactile and 0.8% in the visuomotor condition stated that the 0 ms delay was
asynchronous, thus indicating that stimulation with the intrinsic delay was generally perceived as
synchronous.
VAS Body Ownership Ratings Drop with Increasing Delay
To assess the influence of delay, modality, and delay perception on ownership, we fitted mixed models in a
stepwise procedure. First, we fitted a model that included fixed effects for delay and condition and their
interaction (see Table S6 for model coefficients). To explore whether sensitivity to delay for the different
modalities, as quantified by the PSE, explained additional variance, we added the main effect and the
two- and three-way interactions with delay and condition in a second model. The model fit of the PSE-
model was better than that of the initial model (BIC model 1 = 1676.7, BIC PSE-model = 1709.5), and
the PSE-model explained 32% of the variance in VAS ownership ratings (pseudo R2 = .32). Adding age
as a predictor did not improve the model fit (BIC age-model: 1705.2) and was thus removed from the
model. There was a significant three-way interaction of all predictors (delay 3 modality 3 PSE; b = 2.19,
95% CI: 1.15, 3.23, t(2213.7) = 4.13, p < .001; see Table S7 for all model coefficients). Overall, VAS ratings
of ownership decreased with increasing delay. A stronger decrease in ownership was present especially in
the visuomotor condition for participants with high sensitivity for delay. For lower sensitivity to delay there
was no strong difference in the decrease of ownership between the visuotactile and visuomotor conditions
(see Figure 3).
Summarized Results of Experiment 2
The results from the long stimulation in Experiment 2 show that visuomotor asynchrony when actively mov-
ing the hand in the same setup as in Experiment 1 also induces a decrease in embodiment coupled with an
increase in disownership and sense of deafference. These changes were significantly stronger during visuo-
motor than during visuotactile mismatch. In line with this, the results from the short time exposure to
various delays show that although increasing delay attenuates embodiment in both modalities, in partici-
pants with high delay sensitivity visuomotor delays affected embodiment already at smaller delays.
Together these results might suggest a stronger contribution of visuomotor as compared to visuotactile
synchrony in maintaining embodiment of the own hand or/and a heightened sensitivity to mismatch during
active body movements as compared with passive touch. It should be noted, however, that the visuomotor
task included a tactile component when participants put their hand on the table after each movement tra-
jectory, in which case it may be the trimodal interaction that affects disembodiment more strongly.
DISCUSSION
In two separate experiments and a PCA for a larger sample, we set out to assess how mismatching multi-
modal signals about one’s own body alter the sense of embodiment in healthy participants. For this, the
participant’s hand was passively stroked or actively moved while their own body was seen from a first-per-
son perspective on an HMD in a realistic video-based environment. The visual signals were either delayed
(asynchronous; experimental condition) or presented simultaneously (synchronous; control condition;
although including the system delay of 139 ms) compared to the bodily signals (i.e. tactile or motor
related). We used a (dis)embodiment questionnaire as well as physiological measures that have previously
reported to correlate with body ownership (Experiment 1) and a series of synchrony and embodiment
judgements across different visuotactile and visuomotor delays (Experiment 2). The two studies revealed
three main findings. First, both visuotactile and visuomotor mismatches led to increased disembodiment,
which predominantly involved the feelings of disownership, deafference, and embodiment (PCA results
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). Second, visuomotor delay when actively moving the hand led to a stron-
ger feeling of disembodiment than visuotactile delay during passive touch. In participants with high delay
sensitivity this was also evidenced by a steeper decay of body ownership with increased delay for visuomo-
tor signals (Exp 2). Third, implicit measures of body ownership such as SCR and skin temperature showed
overall no evidence of being modulated by the illusion, except for a small difference in the hand
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temperature that should be taken with caution because it was only significant for the whole duration of the
long-stimulation block and not for shorter periods within that block (Experiment 1).
Multimodal Temporal Mismatches from the Own Hand Alter the Bodily Self
Subjective changes in embodiment were measured with a questionnaire given to the participants after a
stroking period. In line with previous studies (e.g. Gentile et al., 2013; Kannape et al., 2019) asynchronous
stimulation generally reduced the feeling of embodiment, suggesting that synchronous multisensory in-
puts are crucial not only to induce embodiment over a fake body (e.g. Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) but
also to maintain the sense of embodying one’s own body. In a PCA based on the asynchronous visuotactile
stroking, we identified three main factors of the subjective disembodiment experience. These are disow-
nership corresponding to the experience of not belonging of the body, alienation, and perceiving the body
as an image rather than as an actual body; deafference, which, in accordance to Longo et al. (2008) includes
numbness and vividness, plus in our case disappearance of the own body; and embodiment, consisting of
the experience of body ownership, agency, and the feeling of looking at one’s own body. Our results show
that both visuotactile and visuomotor mismatches lead to increased disownership, deafference, and
decreased embodiment respectively, when compared to synchronous stimulation.
In the case of synchronous stimulation, only two main factors were identified in the PCA, namely embodi-
ment and disownership, together accounting for 71% of the variance (see Table S3). These results exclude
the deafference component found for asynchronous stimulation. Although this might be expected because
our bodily experience is not generally accompanied by a sense of deafference, it should be noted that
asynchronous signals led not only to a disruption of the components found for synchronous signals but
also to a new phenomenal component (see Longo et al., 2008 for similar results using a rubber hand illu-
sion). This suggests that disembodiment does not only vary along the dimensions of embodiment and dis-
ownership, but also includes a sense of deafference.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the direct study of disembodiment in contrast to embodiment of a fake
limb is not trivial, as important conceptual (e.g. de Vignemont, 2011; Folegatti et al., 2009) and neuroana-
tomical (Martinaud et al., 2017; Zeller et al., 2011) differences between these two mechanisms have been
suggested. Furthermore, there is only indirect, sparse, and non-conclusive evidence of embodiment of a
fake limb altering disembodiment (de Vignemont, 2011; Folegatti et al., 2009). Thus the currently most
common way to study disembodiment, namely in RHI-like paradigms (Barnsley et al., 2011; Longo et al.,
2008; Moseley et al., 2008), is problematic, as it (1) does not necessarily apply to some disturbances in
body ownership and (2) may not actually induce the phenomena of interest. In this sense, the direct stim-
ulation of disembodiment by altering own-body related signals may be important and more ecologically
valid than using fake limbs. Several experimental setups for stimulating disembodiment on the own
body exist, using mirror-based (e.g. McCabe et al., 2005), MIRAGE (e.g. Newport et al., 2010; Newport
and Gilpin, 2011; Newport and Preston, 2011), infrared camera feed (Kannape et al., 2019), or pre-recorded
setups (Gentile et al., 2013), yet we add to this palette the capacity to show the full body and the natural
environment from a first-person perspective and alter it in real time (see Stanton et al., 2018 for a similar
setup for manipulating non-temporal aspects of the body).
The Effect of Visuomotor as Compared with Visuotactile Mismatch on the Phenomenology of
Disembodiment
Our questionnaire data from Experiment 2 replicated and extended the findings of Experiment 1 by
showing that both asynchronous visuotactile signals as well as asynchronous visuomotor signals lead to
increased disembodiment. Moreover, prolonged asynchronous visuomotor signals had a stronger effect
on disembodiment compared with that of visuotactile signals. Although previous studies using foreign
bodies or body parts have suggested that the tolerance for asynchronous visuotactile versus visuomotor
stimulation during embodiment might differ (Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012; Kokkinara and Slater, 2014; Roel
Lesur et al., 2018; Tsakiris et al., 2006) and the specific contribution of actively moving on the bodily self
has been intensively discussed (Grechuta et al., 2019; Pia et al., 2019), we here compared the relative
contribution of these couplings by directly manipulating signals explicitly related to the own body.
Although it is known that in the clinical population both alterations in the sensory and motor systems
might correlate with feelings of disembodiment, our results suggest that there may be a stronger contri-
bution of the latter to disembodiment. On these lines, for example the rubber hand illusion has been
related to activity in the premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2005; Ehrsson et al., 2004); and in clinical cases
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Burin et al. (2015) found that participants with left upper-limb hemiplegia experienced a greater rubber
hand illusion in their affected hand when compared with both their unaffected hand and a control group,
arguing that the reduction of efferent signals in these participants contributed to weakening their own
body ownership, resulting in a more plastic sense of body. Our results further extend these findings
showing that in healthy participants, breaking visuomotor synchrony facilitates the sense of
disembodiment.
The data from the short trials of different delay stepsmight provide amore sensitive measure of the relation
between small multimodal mismatches and its subjective interpretation and disembodiment. As hypothe-
sized, the results generally showed better asynchrony detection and a decreased sense of ownership over
one’s own body with increased delay. This finding was true for both the tactile and the motor modality, and
there were no significant differences in terms of perceived delay betweenmultimodal couplings. This is sur-
prising as previous literature suggested a greater delay sensitivity depending on the strength of efferent
signals (Hoover and Harris, 2012; Lau et al., 2004; Winter et al., 2008; the latter however without a statisti-
cally significant difference). A possible reason for this difference to previous literature is that our protocol
might not have had a high enough temporal resolution to assess small differences in synchrony judgments,
as previous literature has found it varying between 22 ms (Hoover and Harris, 2012) and 29 ms (Winter et al.,
2008). Moreover, theoretical models would suggest that with the presence of efferent signals, there would
be a stronger expectation of afferent signals (Wolpert, 1997), thus affecting the perception of the afferent
stimuli.
High sensitivity to delay, however, predicted overall lower ownership ratings and especially in the visuo-
motor condition a faster decay. Although previous studies have shown that greater temporal binding win-
dows (TBW) of multisensory integration increase susceptibility to illusory embodiment of a rubber hand
(Costantini et al., 2016), our results show that participants with high delay sensitivity have an overall stron-
ger tendency to lose body ownership with increased delay between visuotactile or visuomotor signals
than participants with lower sensitivity. A recent study found that the binding of incongruent multisensory
signals in the ventriloquist effect (an effect where the location of an auditory stimulus is mapped to that of
a visual stimulus: Pick et al., 1969; Talsma et al., 2010) drops after active movements (Zierul et al., 2019),
i.e., incongruent signals are more easily bound when no efferent signals are involved. Zierul et al. (2019)
expected, following a predictive coding account, that action would modulate the predictions and there-
fore bind incongruent stimuli more with action than without; however, their results showed the contrary.
The authors thus hypothesize that action did form a stronger prediction, yet resulting mismatches were
more salient and therefore multisensory incongruences were more evident. In our results, a similar expla-
nation could be applied, i.e. expectations based on the motor-prediction were broken, whereas for the
only visuotactile signals these expectations were not present. Moreover, in the visuomotor task, there
is, next to matching between the motor command and the seen visual consequence, an additional
mismatch of proprioceptive and visual signals that is not present during purely visuotactile tasks. This
might explain the steeper decay of body ownership with increased delay. In this sense, the matching
of motor predictions with their sensory consequences is important not only for the sense of agency but
also for the maintenance of a healthy sense of ownership (perhaps even more than the temporal coher-
ence of somatosensory signals).
Importantly, low sensitivity to delay did not differently influence ownership sensation in the visuomotor and
visuotactile tasks but rather generally predicted higher ownership. This could suggest that the effect might
bemediated by stronger visual dependence: participants with stronger visual dependence would not be so
sensitive to incongruencies to other senses because they rely stronger on vision as compared to other
senses (Witkin and Asch, 1948). Indeed visual dependence has shown to be correlated with susceptibility
to variousmultisensory illusions (David et al., 2014; Rothacher et al., 2018). A stronger dependence on visual
signals could thus explain why there was no difference in the decay of ownership for visuomotor and visuo-
tactile tasks for participants with low delay sensitivity; however, we did not objectively assess such
dependence.
No Evidence for Physiological Changes
The generally strong effect in the subjective measures of the illusion was not mirrored in the chosen implicit
measures (skin temperature, SCR, HRV), where no evidence for, or only weak effects, were found. Only the
temperature measure tentatively suggests a condition-specific effect by revealing a significantly smaller
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increase of temperature for asynchronous compared with synchronous stroking. This is in line with literature
suggesting that a decrease in body temperature links to own-body disembodiment during illusory embodi-
ment of a fake body (Moseley et al., 2008; Salomon et al., 2013; but see also de Haan et al., 2017) or in neuro-
logical damage (Moseley et al., 2008; but see also Lenggenhager et al., 2015). As in previous literature, such
relatively lower temperature was in our data specifically found for the stimulated hand (Macauda et al.,
2015) and only after longer stimulation (cp. Macauda et al., 2015; Moseley et al., 2008, both reporting a
drop in temperature only after more than aminute of stimulation), which might be related to the adaptation
time homeostatic processesmight need. However, when comparing temperature for different time periods
of the long stimulation block, we found no significant differences between time periods. Thus, these results
should be taken with caution. Moreover, an increasing amount of literature doubts a meaningful relation-
ship between body ownership and body temperature (de Haan et al., 2017).
SCR is an indicator of physiological reactions to threat (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson, 2007).
Previous studies have linked embodiment of an external body part to an SCR when such body part is threat-
ened (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson, 2007), a study has found a weaker SCR with decreased
embodiment of the own body in a setup similar to ours (Gentile et al., 2013), and other studies using the
MIRAGE illusion box for stimulating the hand found a significantly weaker SCR after illusory disappearance
of the hand (Newport and Gilpin, 2011) and asynchronous multimodal stimulation (Newport and Preston,
2010, 2011). Following this, we hypothesized to find a weaker response in the asynchronous compared with
the synchronous stimulation condition. However, such an effect was not evident in our data, with both con-
ditions showing a response to threat. On the other hand, given that HRV has been suggested to be a mea-
sure of homeostatic processes (Berntson et al., 1997), we expected to find lower HRV during asynchronous
stimulation due to a homeostatic disturbance, which was however not evidenced in our analysis.
So far, we can only speculate on the reasons for this lack of significant results in the chosen threat-related
implicit measures. Although generally the relationship between explicit and implicit measures of embodi-
ment manipulations has been questioned (de Haan et al., 2017; Rohde et al., 2011; Rohde et al., 2013), and
in the case of HRV a recent study found no differences after altering embodiment in a full-body illusion (Park
et al., 2016), it may be that the ecological congruency of the seen environment and body might have
impeded an effect on our implicit measures. That is, in our setup participants are actually seeing their
own hand and surroundings, with a higher degree of ecological plausibility compared with previous setups
(e.g. Gentile et al., 2013). From an ecological point of view, it makes sense that participants would more
readily extend the physiological reaction (protective space) to an external object than diminishing it. Addi-
tionally, although there is a significant increase of subjective disembodiment following the asynchronous
stimulation, the degree of the embodiment component is still relatively high (>0.5 on the scale), which
may account for the sustained physiological response. Alternatively, it may be that even if there is an in-
crease of disembodiment of one’s own body during asynchronous stimulation, it might be too fragile
and that body perception may be immediately restored when attention is shifted away from the asynchro-
nous stroking, regardless of limb-related multisensory synchrony. Along these lines it has been proposed a
low degree of ownership does not necessarily result in disownership but that attention to the lack of owner-
ship may (de Vignemont, 2011).
Lastly, although not directly linked to physiological changes but to conscious monitoring of physiological
changes, high interoceptive accuracy has previously been related to lower malleability of the bodily self in
the context of the rubber hand illusion paradigm (Monti et al., 2019; Tsakiris et al., 2011). We thus expected
interoceptive accuracy as measured by a heartbeat counting task to predict the degree of disembodiment
after asynchronous stimulation. Yet, interoceptive accuracy did not predict the strength of disembodiment
in the current study. Our findings are in line with recent studies showing no relation between interoception
and suggestibility to bodily illusions (Crucianelli et al., 2018; David et al., 2014).
General Considerations, Challenges, and Outlook
Setups involving the own body to manipulate embodiment in contrast to requiring supernumerary body
parts (such as the rubber hand illusion) may be more directly related to the loss of ownership described
in certain psychiatric and neurological conditions and may thus be important for understanding such dis-
orders. The use of an HMD for showing and manipulating the full body viewed from a first-person perspec-
tive, and not exclusively a limb, may offer additional advantages. The protocol used in Experiment 2 allows
for a sensitive assessment of the contribution of various multimodal mismatches to the loss of body
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ownership and can be expanded to measure the temporal thresholds in relation to body ownership for
other multimodal couplings. In contrast to illusory supernumerary ownership, which has described to occur
after 11 s in visuotactile rubber hand setups (Ehrsson et al., 2004), 22.8 s in active visuomotor (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2017), 36 s in a visuotactile virtual hand setups (Perez-Marcos et al., 2012), and 20 s in MIRAGE
mixed reality setups (e.g. Newport et al., 2010; Newport and Preston, 2011; Preston and Newport, 2011),
our Experiment 2 shows that even after short periods of stimulation (7 s), it is possible to manipulate the
sense of one’s own body consistently and reliably cp. also (Kannape et al., 2019). Such a procedure can
be sensitive for comparing individual differences as well as between different populations. Future studies
comparing populations and multisensory mismatches are encouraged to shed light on the concept of
bodily self plasticity. On these lines, a direct comparison between the rubber hand or a virtual hand illusion
and our setup would offer important insights.
Although the plasticity of the bodily self has traditionally been measured as the susceptibility to illusory
supernumerary embodiment, there is currently no consensus on whether higher delay sensitivity in terms
of own-body embodiment is a result of a more or less plastic bodily self or vice-versa. Motivating the
question of whether there is a ‘‘general body plasticity’’ or promptness to own-body disembodiment
and to supernumerary embodiment may be separate components of such plasticity. Costantini et al.
(2016) found that a small TBW leads to lower susceptibility to illusory embodiment of a rubber hand,
whereas we found that small TBWs lead to higher susceptibility to own-body disembodiment. This
may seem paradoxical, because the same condition (small TBW) leads to both lower susceptibility to su-
pernumerary embodiment and higher to own-body disembodiment. Such a contrast may suggest the
need of separate components of bodily self plasticity, say one for supernumerary embodiment and
one for own-body disembodiment. This would follow neuroanatomical findings in patients with disorders
of embodiment (Martinaud et al., 2017; Zeller et al., 2011). This differentiation could help to explain the
different results in implicit measures between previous literature and our study. However, it could also be
that more proneness to a disembodiment illusion is actually a result of a less plastic bodily self, thus a
weaker susceptibility to supernumerary embodiment. In this scenario, participants with a highly plastic
sense of body would still maintain embodiment even during stronger multimodal mismatches, adapting
their bodily sense to the ongoing mismatching signals. Although our data are inconclusive regarding this
point, we propose that this is an important debate in the field of bodily self consciousness, which in our
view has not received enough attention. We hope to encourage future experimental inquiries that disen-
tangle these questions; studies directly comparing our protocol with the rubber hand illusion may offer
additional insights.
With the increasing availability of mixed reality technologies, and in particular with the growing availability
of augmented reality, understanding how our sense of body may change through our interactions with a
mediated view of reality and the temporal mismatches that this may entail is of great importance. Again,
the study of bodily self consciousness would benefit of studying more on how seeing one’s own body,
instead of fake or virtual bodies, through digital visual manipulations affects embodiment. This is thus
not only important at a theoretical and clinical level but may imply relevant practical knowledge for a
near future where mixed reality technologies may be ubiquitous and thus constantly manipulate our sense
of body. The study of disembodiment is relevant for various clinical conditions and has been studied rather
indirectly in the general population. Our disembodiment protocol may be important for the scientific study
of bodily self consciousness, both to induce a sense of disembodiment and as an assessment tool. In partic-
ular, it may be a useful method to measure the degree and sensory weighting of bodily self plasticity in the
general as well as clinical populations. The results of the two experiments presented here extend the pre-
vious literature showing that mismatching multisensory signals contribute to increased disembodiment of
one’s own body as expressed by the phenomenal dimensions of disownership, deafference, and embodi-
ment. Moreover, they provide evidence for the differential contribution of sensorimotor signals compared
to somatosensory in maintaining our sense of body. Lastly, we promote a debate regarding the concept of
bodily self plasticity, proposing either that it has two independent dimensions for supernumerary embodi-
ment and for disembodiment respectively or that strong susceptibility to disembodiment is a reflection of
low bodily self plasticity.
Limitations of the Study
Readers should note that in our visuomotor task, participants were instructed to start and end every move-
ment trajectory with their hand on the table during the visuomotor task; therefore the procedure also
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involved touch. Along these lines, the presence of an acoustic metronome may be an additional source of
multisensory binding. Future studies should aim at constraining to the modalities in question. The exper-
imenter was not blinded to the condition when performing the threats in Experiment 1, and neither speed
nor kinematics were controlled for. Lastly, our short trials of Experiment 2 do not allow us to disentangle
whether the explicit judgment of synchrony may affect the participants’ subsequent response regarding
body ownership. Future studies should address this point.
METHODS
All methods can be found in the accompanying Transparent Methods supplemental file.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2020.100901.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
M.R.L., M.L.W., and B.L. were supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number:
PP00P1_170511).
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
M.R.L., M.L.W., and B.L. contributed to the experimental design and the writing of the manuscript. M.R.L.,
M.L.W., and C.S. collected the data. M.L.W. and C.S. performed the statistical analysis. O.A.K. contributed
with a thorough revision of the manuscript.
DECLARATION OF INTERESTS
The authors declare no competing interests.
Received: July 30, 2019
Revised: November 12, 2019
Accepted: January 20, 2020
Published: March 27, 2020
REFERENCES
Aglioti, S., Smania, N., Manfredi, M., and
Berlucchi, G. (1996). Disownership of left hand
and objects related to it in a patient with right
brain damage. NeuroReport 8, 293.
Armel, K.C., and Ramachandran, V.S. (2003).
Projecting sensations to external objects:
evidence from skin conductance response. Proc.
R. Soc. B: Biol. Sci. 270, 1499–1506.
Asai, T. (2015). Feedback control of one’s own
action: self-other sensory attribution in motor
control. Conscious.Cogn. 38, 118–129.
Barnsley, N., McAuley, J.H., Mohan, R., Dey, A.,
Thomas, P., and Moseley, G.L. (2011). The rubber
hand illusion increases histamine reactivity in the
real arm. Curr.Biol. 21, R945–R946.
Berntson, G.G., Bigger, J.T., Jr., Eckberg, D.L.,
Grossman, P., Kaufmann, P.G., Malik, M.,
Nagaraja, H.N., Porges, S.W., Saul, J.P., Stone,
P.H., and Van Der Molen, M.W. (1997). Heart rate
variability: origins, methods, and interpretive
caveats. Psychophysiology 34, 623–648.
Blanke, O. (2012). Multisensory brain mechanisms
of bodily self-consciousness. Nat. Rev. Neurosci.
13, 556–571.
Blanke, O., Slater, M., and Serino, A. (2015).
Behavioral, neural, and computational principles
of bodily self-consciousness. Neuron 88, 145–166.
Blom, R.M., Hennekam, R.C., and Denys, D.
(2012). Body integrity identity disorder. PLoSOne
7, e34702.
Botvinick, M., and Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands
‘‘feel’’ touch that eyes see. Nature 391, 756.
Brugger, P., and Lenggenhager, B. (2014). The
bodily self and its disorders: neurological,
psychological and social aspects.
Curr.Opin.Neurol. 27, 644.
Burin, D., Livelli, A., Garbarini, F., Fossataro, C.,
Folegatti, A., Gindri, P., and Pia, L. (2015). Are
movements necessary for the sense of body
ownership? Evidence from the rubber hand
illusion in pure hemiplegic patients. PLoSOne 10,
e0117155.
Costantini, M., Robinson, J., Migliorati, D.,
Donno, B., Ferri, F., and Northoff, G. (2016).
Temporal limits on rubber hand illusion reflect
individuals’ temporal resolution in multisensory
perception. Cognition 157, 39–48.
Crucianelli, L., Krahe´, C., Jenkinson, P.M., and
Fotopoulou, A.K. (2018). Interoceptive
ingredients of body ownership: affective touch
and cardiac awareness in the rubber hand
illusion. Cortex 104, 180–192.
David, N., Fiori, F., and Aglioti, S.M. (2014).
Susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion does not
tell the whole body-awareness story.
Cogn.AffectiveBehav.Neurosci. 14, 297–306.
Davidson, P.W. (1966). Depersonalization
phenomena in 214 adult psychiatric in-patients.
Psychiatr. Q. 40, 702–722.
de Haan, A.M., van Stralen, H.E., Smit, M., Keizer,
A., Van der Stigchel, S., and Dijkerman, H.C.
(2017). No consistent cooling of the real hand in
the rubber hand illusion. ActaPsychol. 179, 68–77.
de Vignemont, F. (2011). Embodiment, ownership
and disownership. Conscious.Cogn. 20, 82–93.
Ehrsson, H.H. (2007). The experimental induction
of out-of-body experiences. Science 317, 1048.
Ehrsson, H.H. (2012). The concept of body
ownership and its relation to multisensory
integration. In The New Handbook of
Multisensory Processes, B.E. Stein, ed. (MIT
Press), pp. 775–792.
Ehrsson, H.H., Holmes, N.P., and Passingham,
R.E. (2005). Touching a rubber hand: feeling of
body ownership is associated with activity in
12 iScience 23, 100901, March 27, 2020
multisensory brain areas. J. Neurosci. 25, 10564–
10573.
Ehrsson, H.H., Spence, C., and Passingham, R.E.
(2004). That’smy hand! Activity in premotor cortex
reflects feeling of ownership of a limb. Science
305, 875–877.
Folegatti, A., Vignemont, F., dePavani, F.,
Rossetti, Y., and Farne`, A. (2009). Losing one’s
hand: visual-proprioceptive conflict affects touch
perception. PLoSOne 4, e6920.
Garfinkel, S.N., Seth, A.K., Barrett, A.B., Suzuki, K.,
and Critchley, H.D. (2015). Knowing your own
heart: distinguishing interoceptive accuracy from
interoceptive awareness. Biol. Psychol. 104,
65–74.
Gentile, G., Guterstam, A., Brozzoli, C., and
Ehrsson, H.H. (2013). Disintegration of
multisensory signals from the real hand reduces
default limb self-attribution: an fMRI study.
J. Neurosci. 33, 13350–13366.
Graham, K.T., Martin-Iverson, M.T., Holmes, N.P.,
and Waters, F.A. (2015). The projected
hand illusion: component structure in a
community sample and association with
demographics, cognition, and psychotic-like
experiences. Attention Percept. Psychophys. 77,
207–219.
Grechuta, K., Ulysse, L., Rubio Ballester, B., and
Verschure, P.F.M.J. (2019). Self beyond the body:
action-driven and task-relevant purely distal cues
modulate performance and body ownership.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 13, https://doi.org/10.
3389/fnhum.2019.00091.
Hoover, A.E.N., and Harris, L.R. (2012). Detecting
delay in visual feedback of an action as a monitor
of self recognition. Exp. Brain Res. 222, 389–397.
Kalckert, A., and Ehrsson, H.H. (2012). Moving a
rubber hand that feels like your own: a
dissociation of ownership and agency. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 6, https://doi.org/10.3389/
fnhum.2012.00040.
Kalckert, A., and Ehrsson, H.H. (2014). Themoving
rubber hand illusion revisited: comparing
movements and visuotactile stimulation to induce
illusory ownership. Conscious.Cogn. 26, 117–132.
Kalckert, A., and Ehrsson, H.H. (2017). Theonset
time of the ownership sensation in the moving
rubber hand illusion. Front. Psychol. 8, https://
doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00344.
Kannape, O.A., Smith, E.J.T., Moseley, P., Roy,
M.P., and Lenggenhager, B. (2019).
Experimentally induced limb-disownership in
mixed reality. Neuropsychologia 124, 161–170.
Kilteni, K., Maselli, A., Kording, K.P., and Slater,
M. (2015). Over my fake body: body ownership
illusions for studying the multisensory basis of
own-body perception. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9,
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00141.
Kokkinara, E., and Slater, M. (2014). Measuring
the effects through time of the influence of
visuomotor and visuotactile synchronous
stimulation on a virtual body ownership illusion.
Perception 43, 43–58.
Lane, T., Yeh, S.-L., Tseng, P., and Chang, A.-Y.
(2017). Timing disownership experiences in the
rubber hand illusion. Cogn. Res. Princ.Implic. 2, 4.
Lau, H.C., Rogers, R.D., Haggard, P., and
Passingham, R.E. (2004). Attention to intention.
Science 303, 1208–1210.
Lenggenhager, B., Hilti, L., and Brugger, P. (2015).
Disturbed body integrity and the ‘‘rubber foot
illusion.’’. Neuropsychology 29, 205–211.
Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T., and
Blanke, O. (2007). Video ergo sum: manipulating
bodily self-consciousness. Science 317, 1096–
1099.
Loetscher, T., Regard, M., and Brugger, P. (2006).
Misoplegia: a review of the literature and a case
without hemiplegia. J. Neurol. Neurosurg.
Psychiatry 77, 1099–1100.
Lo¨ffler, A., Kleindienst, N., Cackowski, S.,
Schmidinger, I., and Bekrater-Bodmann, R.
(2019). Reductions in whole-body ownership in
borderline personality disorder – a
phenomenological manifestation of dissociation.
J. Trauma Dissociation, 1–14, https://doi.org/10.
1080/15299732.2019.1678213.
Longo, M.R., and Haggard, P. (2009). Sense of
agency primes manual motor responses.
Perception 38, 69–78.
Longo, M.R., Schu¨u¨r, F., Kammers, M.P.M.,
Tsakiris, M., and Haggard, P. (2008). What is
embodiment? A psychometric approach.
Cognition 107, 978–998.
Macauda, G., Bertolini, G., Palla, A., Straumann,
D., Brugger, P., and Lenggenhager, B. (2015).
Binding body and self in visuo-vestibular
conflicts. Eur. J. Neurosci. 41, 810–817.
Martinaud, O., Besharati, S., Jenkinson, P.M., and
Fotopoulou, A. (2017). Ownership illusions in
patients with body delusions: different neural
profiles of visual capture and disownership.
Cortex 87, 174–185.
McCabe, C.S., Haigh, R.C., Halligan, P.W., and
Blake, D.R. (2005). Simulating sensory–motor
incongruence in healthy volunteers: implications
for a cortical model of pain. Rheumatology 44,
509–516.
Monti, A., Porciello, G., Tieri, G., and Aglioti, S.M.
(2019). ‘‘Embreathment’’ illusion reveals
hierarchical influence of respiratory, visual and
spatial signals on corporeal awareness. https://
doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/cn9s3.
Moseley, G.L., Olthof, N., Venema, A., Don, S.,
Wijers, M., Gallace, A., and Spence, C. (2008).
Psychologically induced cooling of a specific
body part caused by the illusory ownership of an
artificial counterpart. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
105, 13169–13173.
Newport, R., Pearce, R., and Preston, C. (2010).
Fake hands in action: embodiment and control of
supernumerary limbs. Exp. Brain Res. 204,
385–395.
Newport, R., and Gilpin, H.R. (2011). Multisensory
disintegration and the disappearing hand trick.
Curr.Biol. 21, R804–R805.
Newport, R., and Preston, C. (2010). Pulling the
finger off disrupts agency, embodiment and
peripersonal space. Perception 39, 1296–1298.
Newport, R., and Preston, C. (2011). Disownership
and disembodiment of the real limb without
visuoproprioceptive mismatch. Cogn.Neurosci.
2, 179–185.
Osumi, M., Nobusako, S., Zama, T., Taniguchi, M.,
Shimada, S., andMorioka, S. (2018). Sensorimotor
incongruence alters limb perception and
movement. Hum. Mov. Sci. 57, 251–257.
Otsuru, N., Hashizume, A., Nakamura, D., Endo,
Y., Inui, K., Kakigi, R., and Yuge, L. (2014). Sensory
incongruence leading to hand disownership
modulates somatosensory cortical processing.
Cortex 58, 1–8.
Park, H.-D., Bernasconi, F., Bello-Ruiz, J., Pfeiffer,
C., Salomon, R., and Blanke, O. (2016). Transient
modulations of neural responses to heartbeats
covary with bodily self-consciousness.
J. Neurosci. 36, 8453–8460.
Perez-Marcos, D., Sanchez-Vives, M.V., and
Slater, M. (2012). Is my hand connected to my
body? The impact of body continuity and arm
alignment on the virtual hand illusion.
Cogn.Neurodyn. 6, 295–305.
Petkova, V.I., and Ehrsson, H.H. (2008). If I were
you: perceptual illusion of body swapping.
PLoSOne 3, e3832.
Pia, L., Garbarini, F., Kalckert, A., and Wong, H.Y.
(2019). Editorial: owning a body + moving a
body = me? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 13, https://
doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2019.00088.
Pick, H.L., Warren, D.H., and Hay, J.C. (1969).
Sensory conflict in judgments of spatial direction.
Percept.Psychophys. 6, 203–205.
Preston, C., and Newport, R. (2011). Differential
effects of perceived hand location on the
disruption of embodiment by apparent physical
encroachment of the limb. Cogn.Neurosci. 2,
163–170.
Roel Lesur, M., Gaebler, M., Bertrand, P., and
Lenggenhager, B. (2018). The plasticity of the
bodily self: head movements in bodily illusions
and their relation to gallagher’s body image and
body schema. Constructivist Foundations 14,
94–105.
Rohde, M., Luca, M.D., and Ernst, M.O. (2011).
The rubber hand illusion: feeling of ownership
and proprioceptive drift do not go hand in hand.
PLoSOne 6, e21659.
Rohde, M., Wold, A., Karnath, H.-O., and Ernst,
M.O. (2013). Thehuman touch: skin temperature
during the rubber hand illusion in manual and
automated stroking procedures. PLoSOne 8,
e80688.
Rothacher, Y., Nguyen, A., Lenggenhager, B.,
Kunz, A., and Brugger, P. (2018). Visual capture of
gait during redirected walking. Sci. Rep. 8, 17974.
Salomon, R., Lim, M., Pfeiffer, C., Gassert, R., and
Blanke, O. (2013). Full body illusion is associated
with widespread skin temperature reduction.
Front. Behav.Neurosci. 7, https://doi.org/10.
3389/fnbeh.2013.00065.
iScience 23, 100901, March 27, 2020 13
Shaqiri, A., Roinishvili, M., Kaliuzhna, M., Favrod,
O., Chkonia, E., Herzog, M.H., Blanke, O., and
Salomon, R. (2018). Rethinking body ownership in
schizophrenia: experimental and meta-analytical
approaches show no evidence for deficits.
Schizophr. Bull. 44, 643–652.
Sierra, M., Baker, D., Medford, N., and David, A.S.
(2005). Unpacking the depersonalization
syndrome: an exploratory factor analysis on the
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale. Psychol.
Med. 35, 1523–1532.
Slater, M., Spanlang, B., Sanchez-Vives, M.V., and
Blanke, O. (2010). First person experience of body
transfer in virtual reality. PLoSOne 5, e10564.
Smit, M., van Stralen, H.E., van den Munckhof, B.,
Snijders, T.J., and Dijkerman, H.C. (2018). The
man who lost his body: suboptimal multisensory
integration yields body awareness problems after
a right temporoparietal brain tumour.
J. Neuropsychol. https://doi.org/10.1111/jnp.
12153.
Stanton, T.R., Gilpin, H.R., Edwards, L., Moseley,
G.L., and Newport, R. (2018). Illusory resizing of
the painful knee is analgesic in symptomatic knee
osteoarthritis. PeerJ 6, https://doi.org/10.7717/
peerj.5206.
Talsma, D., Senkowski, D., Soto-Faraco, S., and
Woldorff, M.G. (2010). The multifaceted interplay
between attention and multisensory integration.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 400–410.
Thakkar, K.N., Nichols, H.S., McIntosh, L.G., and
Park, S. (2011). Disturbances in body ownership in
schizophrenia: evidence from the rubber hand
illusion and case study of a spontaneous out-of-
body experience. PLoSOne 6, e27089.
Tsakiris, M., Jime´nez, A.T., and Costantini, M.
(2011). Just a heartbeat away from one’s body:
interoceptive sensitivity predicts malleability of
body-representations. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B: Biol.
Sci. 278, 2470–2476.
Tsakiris, M., Longo, M.R., and Haggard, P. (2010).
Having a body versus moving your body: neural
signatures of agency and body-ownership.
Neuropsychologia 48, 2740–2749.
Tsakiris, M., Prabhu, G., and Haggard, P. (2006).
Having a body versus moving your body: how
agency structures body-ownership.
Conscious.Cogn. 15, 423–432.
Vallar, G., and Ronchi, R. (2009).
Somatoparaphrenia: a body delusion. A review of
the neuropsychological literature. Exp. Brain Res.
192, 533–551.
van Stralen, H.E., van Zandvoort, M.J.E.,
Kappelle, L.J., and Dijkerman, H.C. (2013). The
rubber hand illusion in a patient with hand
disownership. Perception 42, 991–993.
White, R.C., and AimolaDavies, A.M. (2017).
Asynchrony in the rubber hand paradigm:
unexpected illusions following stroke. Cortex 93,
224–226.
Winter, R., Harrar, V., Gozdzik, M., and Harris, L.R.
(2008). The relative timing of active and passive
touch. Brain Res. 1242, 54–58.
Witkin, H.A., and Asch, S.E. (1948). Studies in
space orientation. IV. Further experiments on
perception of the upright with displaced visual
fields. J. Exp. Psychol. 38, 762–782.
Wolpert, D.M. (1997). Computational approaches
to motor control. Trends Cogn. Sci. 1, 209–216.
Zeller, D., Gross, C., Bartsch, A., Johansen-Berg,
H., and Classen, J. (2011). Ventral premotor
cortex may be required for dynamic changes in
the feeling of limb ownership: a lesion study.
J. Neurosci. 31, 4852–4857.
Zierul, B., Tong, J., Bruns, P., and Ro¨der, B. (2019).
Reducedmultisensory integration of self-initiated
stimuli. Cognition 182, 349–359.
14 iScience 23, 100901, March 27, 2020
iScience, Volume 23
Supplemental Information
Psychometrics of Disembodiment
and Its Differential Modulation
by Visuomotor and Visuotactile Mismatches
Marte Roel Lesur, Marieke Lieve Weijs, Colin Simon, Oliver Alan Kannape, and Bigna
Lenggenhager
TEMPORAL MISMATCHES MODULATE EMBODIMENT 
 
1
Supplementary figures and tables 
 
Table S1 related to Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and pairwise comparisons of additional questionnaire data used in the PCA, 
N = 15. 
 Visuotactile Synchronous Visuotactile Asynchronous    
 Median IQR Median IQR Z p r 
Disownership 0.13 0.04 - 0.27 0.55 0.46 - 0.63 -3.74 <.001 -.68 
q4 0.07 0.03 -0.16 0.67 0.38 - 0.76 -4.01 <.001 -.73 
q6 0.10 0.03 -0.26 0.60 0.33 - 0.70 -3.01 .003 -.55 
q9 0.17 0.03 - 0.39 0.58 0.37 - 0.70 -2.71 .007 -.49 
Deafference 0.04 0.03 - 0.11 0.58 0.27 - 0.63 -3.52 <.001 -.64 
q10 0.06 0.02 - 0.13 0.72 0.36 - 0.77 -3.33 <.001 -.61 
q8 0.06 0.03 - 0.10 0.53 0.09 - 0.67 -2.64 .008 -.48 
q7 0.04 0.02 - 0.09 0.34 0.06 - 0.65 -3.74 <.001 -.68 
Embodiment 0.90 0.85 - 0.96 0.58 0.41 - 0.73 -4.01 <.001 -.73 
q1 0.95 0.90 - 0.98 0.70 0.28 - 0.81 -4.01 <.001 -.73 
q11 0.94 0.83 - 0.97 0.63 0.52 - 0.78 -3.42 <.001 -.63 
q5 0.92 0.71 - 0.96 0.39 0.17 - 0.69 -3.33 <.001 -.61 
Control item and manipulation check      
q3 0.96 0.94 - 0.99 0.93 0.85 - 0.97 -2.23 .026 -.41 
q2 0.96 0.84 - 0.98 0.68 0.24 - 0.72 -2.57 .010 -.47 
Components based on the PCA in the synchronous condition  
Component 1 0.21 0.17 - 0.31 0.50 0.39 - 0.56 -4.01 <.001 -.73 
Component 2 0.94 0.87 - 0.97  0.70 0.44 - 0.79 -4.01 <.001 -.73 
Note: VAS ratings on q5 were inversed, so that higher scored indicate higher embodiment. 
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Table S2 Related to Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and pairwise comparisons of questionnaire data in Experiment 1, N = 30. 
 Visuotactile Synchronous Visuotactile Asynchronous    
 Median IQR Median IQR Z p r 
Disownership 0.14 0.05 - 0.41 0.61 0.40 - 0.72 -5.08 <.001 -0.66 
q4 0.11 0.03 – 0.30 0.59 0.25 – 0.78 -4.59 .005 -0.59 
q6 0.07 0.03 – 0.23 0.54 0.18 – 0.70 -4.96 <.001 -0.64 
q9 0.20 0.05 – 0.53 0.61 0.31 – 0.78 -4.34 <.001 -0.56 
Deafference 0.14 0.04 - 0.41 0.30 0.22 - 0.52 -5.83 <.001 -0.75 
q10 0.11 0.03 – 0.43 0.29 0.12 – 0.69 -4.17 <.001 -0.53 
q8 0.26 0.04 – 0.40 0.52 0.21 – 0.70 -4.20 <.001 -0.54 
q7 0.07 0.03 – 0.17 0.18 0.07 – 0.46 -4.34 <.001 -0.56 
Embodiment 0.89 0.75 - 0.95 0.72 0.62 - 0.82 -3.81 <.001 -0.49 
q1 0.91 0.88 – 0.98 0.78 0.67 – 0.86 -4.17 <.001 -0.54 
q11 0.94 0.79 – 0.96 0.76 0.67 – 0.84 -3.58 <.001 -0.46 
q5 0.90 0.72 - 0.96 0.73 0.38 - 0.87 -2.78 <.001 -0.36 
Control item and manipulation 
check 
      
q3 0.93 0.84 – 0.97 0.91 0.81 – 0.97 -1.31 .191 -0.16 
q2 0.85 0.57 – 0.97 0.51 0.28 – 0.75 -3.28 .001 -0.42 
Components based on the PCA 
in the synchronous condition  
      
Component 1 0.25 0.18 - 0.45 0.48 0.39 - 0.57 -5.57 <.001 -.72 
Component 2 0.93 0.84 - 0.96  0.78  0.67 - 0.82 -3.84 <.001 -.50 
Note: VAS ratings on q5 were inversed, so that higher scored indicate higher embodiment. 
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Table S3 Related to Table 1 
Results of the PCA on questionnaire responses in the synchronous condition 
 Varimax rotated factor loadings 
 Component 1 Component 2 commonalities 
q4 0.87 0.27 0.83 
q10 0.87 0.06 0.76 
q7 0.81 0.27 0.73 
q6 0.79 0.44 0.82 
q8 0.72 0.38 0.66 
q9 0.71 0.41 0.67 
q5 0.67 0.12 0.46 
q11 0.10 0.87 0.77 
q1 0.34 0.72 0.64 
Eigenvalues 4.39 1.95  
% of variance  49 22  
 
 
 
Figure S1 Related to Table 1: The scree plot of the PCA in the asynchronous condition justifies 
retaining three components for the secondary PCA.   
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Table S4 Related to Figure 2 
Descriptive statistics of questionnaire data in Experiment 2,  N = 32 
 Visuotactile Synchronous Visuotactile Asynchronous Visuomotor Synchronous Visuomotor Asynchronous  Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR 
Disownership 0.28 0.16 - 0.43 0.57 0.43 – 0.70 0.32 0.17 – 0.46 0.66 0.49 – 0.77 
q4 0.17 0.09 - 0.36 0.60 0.34 - 0.69 0.20 0.10 - 0.30 0.72 0.56 - 0.82 
q6 0.21 0.09 - 0.29 0.62 0.32 - 0.73 0.18 0.07 - 0.33 0.69 0.57 - 0.85 
q9 0.50 0.24 - 0.68 0.67 0.40 - 0.76 0.58 0.26 - 0.74 0.62 0.33 - 0.80 
Deafference 0.19 0.08 – 0.45 0.34 0.15 – 0.48 0.20 0.10 – 0.38 0.42 0.22 – 0.56 
q10 0.16 0.06 - 0.30 0.25 0.17 - 0.43 0.17 0.08 - 0.41 0.38 0.22 - 0.64 
q8 0.19 0.10 - 0.59 0.4 0.14 - 0.69 0.24 0.08 - 0.61 0.37 0.19 - 0.66 
q7 0.12 0.06 - 0.28 0.23 0.06 - 0.40 0.10 0.05 - 0.28 0.31 0.15 - 0.48 
Embodiment 0.81 0.70 - 0.93 0.58 0.44 – 0.71 0.86 0.71 - 0.91 0.43 0.34 - 0.54 
q1 0.90 0.81 - 0.97 0.65 0.41 - 0.78 0.91 0.81 - 0.95 0.42 0.28 - 0.68 
q11 0.85 0.78 - 0.93 0.7 0.37 - 0.82 0.89 0.80 - 0.96 0.54 0.29 - 0.69 
q5 0.81 0.59 - 0.91 0.43 0.26 - 0.66 0.81 0.61 - 0.92 0.31 0.15 - 0.54 
Control item and manipulation check        
q3 0.91 0.84 - 0.97 0.86 0.80 - 0.94 0.89 0.78 - 0.97 0.86 0.68 - 0.96 
q2 0.85 0.57 - 0.95 0.53 0.18 - 0.69 0.89 0.77 - 0.95 0.66 0.56 - 0.81 
Components based on the PCA in the synchronous condition (see Table S3)  
Component 1 0.30 0.22 - 0.47 0.48 0.36 - 0.56 0.34 0.24 - 0.44 0.49 0.42 - 0.61 
Component 2 0.87 0.80 - 0.93 0.64 0.47 - 0.75 0.89  0.82 - 0.93 0.47 0.34 - 0.60 
Note: VAS ratings on q5 were inversed, so that higher scored indicate higher embodiment. 
TEMPORAL MISMATCHES MODULATE EMBODIMENT 
 
5
 
Table S5 Related to Figure 2 
Results of Friedman tests and post-hoc comparisons of questionnaire in Experiment 2, using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests, FDR corrected p-values   
 Friedman test VTsyn - VTasyn VMsyn - VMasyn VTsyn - VMsyn VTasyn - VMasyn 
 χ
ଶ df p Z pcorrected r Z pcorrected r Z pcorrected r Z pcorrected r 
Disownership 35.51 3 <.001 -4.42 <.001 -0.55 -5.12 <.001 -0.64 -0.05 .963 -0.01 -2.31 .021 -0.29 
q4 39.38 3 <.001 -4.19 <.001 -0.52 -5.09 <.001 -0.63 -0.06 .949 -0.01 -2.52 .016 -0.31 
q6 43.46 3 <.001 -4.72 <.001 -0.59 -5.30 <.001 -0.66 -0.25 .803 -0.03 -3.04 .003 -0.38 
q9 7.76 3 .051             
Deafference 26.78 3 <.001 -3.36 <.001 -0.42 -3.77 <.001 -0.47 -0.69 .488 -0.09 -1.98 .048 -0.25 
q10 28.56 3 <.001 -3.63 .001 -.045 -3.41 .001 -0.43 -1.71 .087 -0.21 -3.50 .001 -0.44 
q8 5.66 3 .129             
q7 19.95 3 <.001 -2.16 .062 -0.27 -4.72 <.001 -0.59 -0.10 .919 -0.01 -1.94 .069 -0.24 
Embodiment 59.36 3 <.001 -4.58 <.001 -0.57 -5.92 <.001 -0.74 -0.97 .331 -0.12 -2.85 .005 -0.36 
q1 55.65 3 <.001 -4.19 <.001 -0.52 -5.86 <.001 -0.73 -0.05 .963 -0.01 -2.54 .015 -0.05 
q11 52.46 3 <.001 -4.24 <.001 -0.53 -6.23 <.001 -0.78 -1.54 .139 -0.19 -1.48 .139 -0.19 
q5 49.24 3 <.001 -3.63 .001 -0.45 -4.90 <.001 -0.61 -0.18 .861 -0.02 -2.76 .008 -0.34 
Control item and manipulation check             
q2    -3.61 <.001 -0.45 -3.68 <.001 -0.46       
q3 9.19 3 .027 -1.96 .100 -0.24 -2.46 .056 -0.31 -0.05 .963 -0.01 -1.69 .121 -0.21 
Components based on the PCA in the synchronous condition (see Table S3)  
Component 1 30.41 3 <.001 -3.87 <.001 -.48 -4.31 <.001 -.54 -.92 .36 -.11 -2.22 .04 -.28 
Component 2 60.86 3 <.001 -4.81 <.001 -.60 -6.23 <.001 -.78 -1.37 .17 -.17 -2.48 .02 -.31 
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Table S6 Related to Figure 3 
Summary of the initial mixed model, including the fixed effects for delay and modality, and their 
two-way interaction 
  Confidence interval     
fixed effects b  lower upper SE df t p 
intercept 0.923 0.866 0.981 0.029 46.29 31.49 <.001 
Delay -0.718 -0.772 -0.665 0.027 2525 -8.84 <.001 
Modality 0.038 0.002 0.074 0.018 2525 2.29 .04 
Delay x Modality -0.154 -0.230 -0.079 0.039 2525 -4.47 <.001 
Notes: Modality (0 = Visuotactile, 1 = Visuomotor)  
 
 
 
 
Table S7 Related to Figure 3 
Summary of the final mixed model, including the predictors delay, modality, and PSE, and the two-
way and three-way interactions. 
  Confidence interval     
fixed effects b  lower upper SE df t p 
intercept 0.830 0.788 0.871 0.027 37.23 34.32 <.001 
Delay -0.717 -0.880 -0.553 0.082 33.82 -8.69 <.001 
Modality 0.007 -0.017 0.031 0.017 2473.88 1.84 .066 
PSE 0.790 0.485 1.099 0.210 1393.73 4.24 <.001 
Delay x Modality -0.164 -0.232 -0.096 0.035 2471.39 -4.73 <.001 
Delay x PSE -0.724 -1.609 0.149 0.446 1633.18 -1.62 .105 
Modality x PSE -0.511 -0.878 -0.148 0.251 2086.97 -3.26 .001 
Delay x Modality x PSE  2.188 1.153 3.233 0.530 2213.69 4.13 <.001 
Notes: Modality (0 = Visuotactile, 1 = Visuomotor), PSE was mean-centered around 0, lower 
values correspond to high sensitivity, and higher values to low sensitivity.  
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Transparent Methods 
Experiment 1 
 
Participants. Thirty healthy volunteers participated in Experiment 1 (10 males; M = 25, SD 
= 3.8 years). Participants provided informed consent and received either course credit or 
financial compensation.  
 For the PCA of the questionnaire responses after synchronous versus asynchronous 
stroking, we additionally included the participants of Experiment 2 (see section Participants 
for Experiment 2), as well as 15 participants (3 males; M = 22.2, SD = 2.4 years) from a 
previously unpublished experiment resulting in a total of 77 participants (27 males; M = 22.9, 
SD = 4.0 years).  These were recorded in the same setting and using the same experimental 
materials as the other studies, with the only difference being that for 5 individuals the 
stroking lasted 60 s and for ten individuals 90 s. The participants were not included in the 
general analysis as we did not record the physiological measures in that sample.  
All protocols were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and 
Social Sciences at the University of Zurich (Approval Number 17.12.15). The studies were 
performed in accordance with the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki.  
Apparatus for stimulation.  An Oculus CV1 HMD (Oculus VR, Irvine, CA, USA) was used 
for the visual stimulation. An ELP 180˚ webcam (Ailipu Technology Co., Ltd, Guangdong, 
China) was positioned on the front of the HMD, set to 30 frames per second and resolution of 
1024 x 768 pixels. The camera was positioned with the wide side of view (1024 pixels) on 
the vertical axis in order to more clearly show the full-body. The control system was 
designed using Unity 2017 for delaying the camera feed, rotating the image, mapping it to a 
3D model approximately matching the distortion of the camera-lens, and projecting the image 
on the HMD. A qualitative calibration was done before the experiment to approximately 
match the visual field of view in the HMD to that without the HMD as well as to the seen and 
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felt (proprioceptive) position of the body. The questionnaires and randomization were also 
built within Unity 2017. The system was run on an Alienware 15 R3 computer (Nvidia 
Geforce GTX 1080 8GB; 16GB RAM; Intel Core i7; Windows 10). The mean intrinsic delay 
of the camera feed added by the system was of 139.1ms (SD = 18.3 ms).  
Procedure. 
 
Heartbeat counting task. At the beginning of the experiment, participants performed 
a heartbeat counting task (Schandry, 1981), see Figure 1a (in the main text) for general 
procedure and order of the experiment. Participants were instructed to count their heartbeats, 
without taking their pulse. They were informed that the time of the intervals would vary, to 
prevent them relying on time estimation instead of actual counting of the heartbeats. Three 
intervals of 25, 35, and 45 s were presented in randomized order, and the start and end of 
each interval was indicated by a tone. During the task, electrocardiograms (ECG) were 
recorded with a Biopac MP150 system and ECG100C amplifier (Goleta, USA) at 1000 Hz 
sampling rate. Three ECG electrodes (Red Dot, 3M, Neuss, Germany) were placed on the left 
and right clavicle and on the lowest left rib. The electrodes were left to measure ECG 
throughout the experimental procedure.   
The heartbeat perception score, which reflects the normalized difference between 
recorded and perceived heartbeats in a way that higher scores indicate higher accuracy, was 
calculated using the following equation:  
heartbeat perception score=1/3෍ 1- |recorded heartbeats-perceived heartbeats|recorded heartbeats  
Data from 10 participants were excluded due to technical difficulties with the ECG recording 
equipment, missing markers, or because they did not understand the task.   
Visuotactile stimulation. After performing the heartbeat counting task, the 
thermocouples and additional electrodes for measuring electrodermal activity were put on. 
Participants received verbal instructions about the visuotactile stimulation procedure and 
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were helped to put on the HMD. After reading instructions on the HMD, they performed a 
test trial where they selected “strongly agree” on a visual analogue scale (VAS) from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” to indicate that they were ready. A few seconds of 
exposure to a synchronous video feed of their own bodies on the table followed to acquaint 
participants with the task and the virtual environment. For the experiment participants were 
instructed to not move and keep especially the head in a fixed position.  
 First a block with synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation of 60 s each 
was presented. Asynchrony was achieved by adding a 594 ms delay to the ~139 ms intrinsic 
delay, we refer to the synchronous condition as such despite the fact that it included the 
system delay of ~139 ms. The stroking in both conditions was performed by the experimenter 
following the same strategy with a stroking rate of approximately 1 Hz in randomized 
directions for all fingers while monitoring the participant's perspective on a computer screen. 
The order of synchrony was counterbalanced across participants. After the 60 s of 
stimulation, the experimenter threatened the participant’s left hand with a plastic knife in a 
stabbing motion, which was followed by a 30 s rest period where the video feedback was 
displayed without any tactile stimulation, to assess change in heartrate. Participants were 
informed about the knife threat before starting the experiment, but did not know when it 
would occur. Both the synchronous and asynchronous condition were followed by the 
(dis)embodiment questionnaire. A block of 180 s of synchronous and asynchronous 
visuotactile stimulation followed. After 180 s of visuotactile stimulation, the experimenter 
threatened the participant’s left hand with the plastic knife in a sliding motion. The 30 s rest 
period followed again. The 180 s blocks were aimed at assessing HRV during the 
manipulation of embodiment, and were not followed by the embodiment questionnaire. 
Again, the order of synchrony was counterbalanced across participants.  
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The experiment was concluded with a brief semi-structured interview on the 
experiences of the participant and a short debriefing. The full procedure took about 45 
minutes. 
Measures of illusion strength. 
(Dis)embodiment questionnaire. The subjective experience of the illusion was 
assessed with a questionnaire (see Table 1 for illusion related questions, and additional 
control questions). Two questions were used as control items, respectively q2 (It felt as if the 
stroking I felt on my hand was due to the seen stroking) and q3 (It seemed as if the seen hand 
resembled my own hand in terms of its shape and structure). For the former we expected 
changes between conditions given that it was foreseen to change with the manipulation, but 
not in respect of body perception; while for the latter we expected no changes between 
conditions. The questionnaire was based on other studies, including the original rubber hand 
illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), a full-body illusion (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & 
Blanke, 2007), the psychometric approach developed by Longo and colleagues ((Longo, 
Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008), other psychometric approaches (Dobricki & 
Rosa, 2013) and additional new items to specifically assess disembodiment. Participants 
indicated on a VAS scale ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree” 
(respectively mapped to values ranging between 0 and 1) how much they agreed with each of 
the 11 statements. Based on the PCA (see section The effect of visuomotor as compared to 
visuotactile mismatch on the phenomenology of disembodiment in the main text), three 
subscales of disownership, deafference, and embodiment were identified. The questionnaire 
was displayed in the HMD and participants responded by means of head movements: they 
would select the corresponding position on the scale by looking at it for 1 s, after which they 
had to look at another button for 1 s to proceed to the next item.    
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Skin temperature. Skin temperature was measured with an HH309A Data Logger 
thermometer (Omega, Stanford, CT, USA) at a 0.5 Hz sampling rate with a resolution of 0.1° 
C per thermocouple. Such device has been previously used to assess changes in skin 
temperature in embodiment-related experimental paradigms (Macauda et al., 2015; Salomon, 
Lim, Pfeiffer, Gassert, & Blanke, 2013). Two thermocouples were placed on the left and right 
ventral side of the wrist, and a third on the back of the neck. A fourth thermocouple was used 
to monitor room temperature. While not systematically measured, the time since entering the 
room, setting up the equipment and doing the tasks previous to the temperature recording, 
served for the participant’s adaptation to the room temperature. Temperature was measured 
for the full length of the visuotactile stimulation in each condition. For each thermocouple, a 
baseline was calculated as the average temperature of the first 6 s of recording. This average 
value was subtracted from the subsequent recordings to represent the relative change in skin 
temperature across the stimulation period. In the short conditions, average temperature 
change was computed over 54 s (60 – 6 s baseline). In the long conditions, the average 
temperature change was computed over 174 s. One participant had to be excluded from the 
analyses due to technical problems. Two additional participants in the 60 s-blocks, and four 
in the 180 s-blocks were excluded due to missing data. We controlled for changes in room 
temperature by assessing differences in room temperature change between the asynchronous 
and synchronous condition, which were not significant in both the short block (p = .54) and 
the long block (p = .33).  
 Skin conductance responses. Threat evoked SCRs were recorded with a Biopac 
MP150 system and EDA100C amplifier (Goleta, USA) at a 1000 Hz sampling rate. Two 
electrodes with electrode paste were placed on the participant’s index and middle finger of 
the non-stimulated right hand. The experimenters threatened the left hand of the participant, 
by making a stabbing motion in the short block, and a sliding motion in the long block, 
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without touching the hand. A sound signal on the experimenter’s headphones indicated the 
onset of the threat at the corresponding time depending on the condition, and a manual 
marker was placed in the raw data file immediately after presenting the threat. The data was 
processed in Acqknowledge software (Version 4.1, Biopac, Goleta, USA). The SCR was 
identified as the maximum peak-to-peak value in electrodermal activity between 2 s before, 
to 6 s after the marker. The 2 s before were taken into account, as it reflects the time from the 
threat to the actual manual pressing of the marker. The SCR response was then computed as a 
relative value, taking into account the average raw SCR of all four threat responses. It was 
computed by dividing the SCR in each condition, by the average SCR of all four conditions 
in order to standardize the values. The data was gathered separately by two experimenters, 
blindly analyzed and compared. Absent responses were registered as missing values. Data 
from five participants were excluded from the analysis due to missing responses or technical 
difficulties.   
Heart Rate Variability. A synchronous and asynchronous block of three-minute-long 
visuotactile stimulation was added to the procedure to assess HRV. ECG was recorded with 
the Biopac MP150 system as described previously. 160 seconds of recording were used, with 
an onset 10 s after the stimulation onset up to 10 s before the threat marker. The R-package 
RHRV (Rodriguez-Linares et al., 2017) was used to detect R-peaks and extract the Root 
Mean Square of the Successive Differences (RMSSD) as a measure of HRV. Data from four 
participants were excluded from the analysis due to technical difficulties.  
Data analysis. Data were analyzed with R (R Core Team, 2018) version 3.5.1. Alpha 
level was set at 0.05, or 95% confidence intervals, excluding 0, and p-values were adjusted 
for multiple comparisons using false discovery rate (FDR) corrections (Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995). Data were tested for normality, and appropriate tests were used 
accordingly. Details of preprocessing of the physiological data are described above.  
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Principal Component Analysis. A PCA was used to investigate the structure of 
participants’ experience, and to quantify the complex experience during this illusion. The 
PCA was conducted on the questionnaire data after synchronous or asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation. In order to maximize the number of participants we took the questionnaire data 
from Experiment 1 and questionnaire data from the long visuotactile stroking of Experiment 
2 (see below) as well as additional data of 15 participants in an unpublished experiment (see 
Table S1, for descriptive statistics and item comparisons of these additional participants). 
Exposure time was 60 s in experiment 1 (n = 30), 90 s in experiment 2 (n = 32), and differed 
for the additional data between 60 s (n = 6) and 90 s (n = 9).  
 Before running the PCA, the ratings of q1 and q11 were inversed, so that all items 
were coded in the same direction, with higher ratings indicating decreased embodiment. Two 
PCAs were separately run for the asynchronous and synchronous conditions. Adequacy of 
using PCA was assessed by Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which was highly significant for both 
the asynchronous (2(55) = 238.6, p < .0001), and synchronous condition (2(55) = 506.9, p 
< .0001), indicating that correlations between individual items were sufficiently large for 
PCA. The overall Kayser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified that the sample size was 
adequate, both for the asynchronous (KMO =  0.71), and synchronous (KMO = 0.85) 
condition. The two control items (q2 and q3) were excluded from the PCA, based on the low 
expected correlation with any of the other questionnaire items in the asynchronous 
conditions, as well as their poor individual KMO (both < 0.55) (Kaiser, 1974). An initial 
PCA was computed with 9 components. Inspection of the eigenvalues of each component and 
the scree plot (Figure S1) justified retaining three components for the secondary PCA. For 
subsequent comparisons between conditions component scores were calculated as the mean 
of q4, q6, and q9 for Component 1; q7, q8, and q10 for Component 2; and q1, q11, and (1 - 
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q5) for Component 3.  For the component scores, q5 was inversed to ensure that higher 
ratings correspond to increased embodiment for all items within Component 3.   
Experiment 2 
Participants. Thirty-two healthy volunteers participated in Experiment 2 (7 males; M = 21.2, 
SD = 3.9 years old). None of the participants took part in Experiment 1, and all gave 
informed consent and received either course credits or a financial compensation. The protocol 
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the 
University of Zurich (Approval Number 17.12.15). The study was performed in accordance 
with the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki.  
Apparatus for stimulation. The apparatus to present visual stimulation was identical to 
Experiment 1 (Apparatus for stimulation for Experiment 1). An additional laptop was used to 
play a metronome sound with its built-in speakers. 
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two different parts: first, two blocks with multiple 
trials of short stimulation, either visuotactile or visuomotor were presented, then four 
conditions of longer stimulations, either visuomotor or visuotactile both either synchronous 
or delayed were presented (see Figure 1b in the main text for an overview of the procedure). 
When participants were ready, they were helped to put on the HMD and read instructions on 
the screen. Similar to Experiment 1, the testing procedure was preceded by a test trial to 
practice giving responses on the VAS scale, and exposure to a synchronous image of the 
participant’s body with their hands on the table for a few seconds. 
For the visuotactile block, participants were asked to fix their left hand between the 
two markers on the table while they were stroked with a small paintbrush outwards from their 
arm on their index and middle fingers at a rate of approximately 0.5 Hz with the aid of a 
metronome set to 1 Hz. The first click of the metronome would be to stroke down the finger 
and release, and the second click to go back without touching to start the next stroke. This 
would be repeated across the whole trial. For the visuomotor block they were asked to move 
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their left hand horizontally from the left to the right marker (set at a distance of 
approximately 60 cm from each other) and back repeatedly, following the rhythm of a 
metronome (set to 1 Hz), each back-and-forth movement would last 0.5 Hz. Participants 
started and ended each trajectory with their hand touching the table. Each trial lasted 7 s and 
was followed by the question “Was the touch/movement you saw and felt synchronous?”, 
which could be answered by either selecting yes or no. This question was followed by the 
statement “It felt as if the hand that I saw was my own”, which could be answered on a VAS 
scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The first two blocks consisted of 40 
trials with four repetitions of 10 possible delay steps of 66 ms each, resulting in a range from 
139 to 733 ms (including the intrinsic delay). The order of the visuomotor and visuotactile 
blocks were counterbalanced across participants.  
Finally, a block of longer stimulation followed, where we presented four conditions 
(synchronous visuotactile, synchronous visuomotor, asynchronous visuotactile and 
asynchronous visuomotor) in counterbalanced order. The asynchronous conditions had a 
delay of 594 ms (plus the intrinsic 139.1 ms delay). During the visuomotor conditions, 
participants moved their hands as in the previous block but for a longer period; similarly, for 
the visuotactile condition, participants were stroked on their hand with a paintbrush randomly 
over the full hand at a rate of approximately 1 stroke per second for a period of 90 s, the 
stroking was monitored on the computer screen by the experimenter to prevent the overlap of 
the previous seen stroke with the ongoing tactile stroke in the asynchronous condition. After 
each condition, they were asked to answer the (dis)embodiment questionnaire (see section 
(Dis)embodiment questionnaire).  
Participants could take breaks and remove the HMD in between blocks. The 
experiment was concluded with a brief semi-structured interview on the experiences of the 
participant and a short debriefing. The overall procedure took about 50 minutes.  
TEMPORAL MISMATCHES MODULATE EMBODIMENT 
 
16
Measures of illusion strength. The assessment for the short stimulation was based on 
simultaneity judgment methods used to measure temporal windows of multisensory 
integration (Engel & Dougherty, 1971; Hirsh & Fraisse, 1964; Hoover & Harris, 2012, 2016), 
and an embodiment question derived from several studies (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Dobricki & Rosa, 2013; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). After each block of 90 s, participants 
completed an identical questionnaire as in Experiment 1. Item 3 corresponded to a control 
item and differed between conditions, and was “It felt as if the movement I felt was due to the 
seen movement” in the visuomotor condition, and “It felt as if the stroking I felt on my hand 
was due to the seen stroking” in the visuotactile condition.  
Data analysis. The same software and parameters for significance were used as in 
Experiment 1. The questionnaire was analyzed using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to assess the 
effect of synchrony (visuotactile synchronous vs. visuotactile asynchronous and visuomotor 
synchronous vs. visuomotor asynchronous) and the effect of modality (visuotactile 
synchronous vs. visuomotor synchronous and visuotactile asynchronous vs. visuomotor 
asynchronous).  
 Sensitivity to delay was assessed by determining the Point of Subjective Equality 
(PSE) for each participant in the visuomotor and visuotactile condition separately. To this 
end, logistic psychometric functions were fitted to the forced choice synchrony judgements of 
each participant, using a binomial Generalized Linear Model (glm) with delay as a predictor. 
The estimated coefficients of the glm were used to calculate the PSE: −β0 / β1, where β0 
corresponds to the intercept and β1 to the slope. Goodness of fit was assessed with the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test, and data of one participant in the visuotactile condition was 
excluded due to bad fit of the glm. All other psychometric curves did not yield a significant 
test result, and corresponding PSEs were thus used for further analyses.   
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 Generalized linear mixed models were fitted with the lme4 package in R (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). A generalized linear mixed model was fitted to the VAS 
ownership ratings in the short block, across different delays, which ensured for adequate 
power while considering the repeated measures within individuals. The intraclass correlation 
demonstrated that observations within individuals were non-independent (ICC(1) = .27, F(31, 
2528) = 31, p < .001), thus justifying the use of a mixed model. Visual inspection of 
diagnostic plots of the residuals showed that these were normally distributed. The model that 
included both a random intercept and slope for individuals, where VAS ratings were 
explained as a function of delay, fitted the data better than the model that included only the 
random intercept and no random slope (2(2) = 470, p < .001). Therefore, we used the 
random intercept and slope model for further hypothesis testing. 
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